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to the Hanover rule, and saying that where a subsequent user tries to take
the benefit of Plaintiff's reputation, "or to forestall the extension of its trade,"
he commits an injury which the courts will take steps to bring to an end.
As the law stands, trade-mark users are in a dilemma. They must either,
immediately upon opening business, ship their goods to all markets where
they may want to expand in the future, or later risk having to give up
territory because someone else has established himself there using the same
trade-mark. At the same time, the innocent second appropriator must be
protected. Possibly the only way to reach a satisfactory result is to require
the registration of all trade-marks before they have any validity, so that
it can be ascertained whether a mark is being used before time and expense
have been expended in acquiring a market and promoting good will.
The question of whether the right of a business to expand will be pro-
tected in the future, and the rights of a subsequent user limited to agree
with the sort of factual set-up found in the Hanover and Rectanus cases,
will probably remain confused and unsettled until the Supreme Court of
the United States hands down a decision on the matter. Until that time,
it will be almost impossible to forecast what the result of any one suit will
be. In the noted case, the decision would seem to be correct, even though
the court does not give any weight to possible expansion in the future. The
fact that appellant has expanded but little during its 20 years of life would
or might be one element to consider in what might be termed its "natural
expansion". At the same time, the fact that appellee has worked up a large
trade at considerable expense for over seven years might bring it within
the scope of the Hanover and Rectanus cases, and would be sufficient cause
for denying appellant relief.1 4  P. K. R.
SALES-LIABILrrY OF A MANUFACTURER FOR MISREPRESENTATIONS TO SUE-
PURCHASEsR.-Plaintiff purchased from a retail dealer an automobile, repre-
sented by the manufacturer and dealer by advertisements to be equipped with
a safety windshield. Because of the shattering of the windshield when the
plaintiff had a collision, particles of glass cut him, injuring him severely. This
action was brought against the manufacturer. Held, (1) no cause of action
exists in warranty without privity; and (2) knowledge of falsity of representa-
tion is necessary for liability for misrepresentation. 1
The law of warranty is older by a century than special assumpsit. In
fact the action upon the case on a warranty was one of the bases upon which
the law of assumpsit seems to have been built.2 The first reported case of
operated barber shops in New York City from 1908, and at the time of suit
had 31 shops and expended $75,000 yearly in advertising. Defendant opened
five shops in New York and New Jersey, applying the name "Terminal" to
them, with a resulting confusion to the public. Plaintiff was granted an
injunction covering not only New York where his shops were located, but also
New Jersey.
14There can be no doubt of the cases noted, because of the finding that
the trade-mark of appellant and that of appellee were not confusingly similar.
The question as to the geographic extent to which trade-marks would be
protected could be controlling only where there was a confusing similarity.
1 Chanin v. Chevrolet Motor Co. (C. C. A., seventh circuit), 89 F. (2d) 889.
2 Williston, Sales (2d), Sec. 195.
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an action on a warranty brought in assumpsit was not until 1778.8 Although,
from that time on, the general practice has been to bring an action for
breach of warranty in contract, today we still have an action of tort for
warranty irrespective of any fraud on the part of the seller or knowledge on
his part that the representation constituting the warranty was true.4 Ad-
mitting that an action will lie for warranty in tort, the problem arises of
whether or not one must be in privity of contract to bring this action. In
the English case of Winterbottom v. Wright,5 the rule was announced that
a cause of action in tort did not arise from the breach of a duty existing by
virtue of contract unless there is a privity of contract between the plaintiff
and the defendant. This "citadel of privity" has been pierced in many
situations.6 The Uniform Sales Act seems to limit a warranty to a transaction
between the seller and the immediate buyer.7 However, upon looking at the
cases that have applied this Act there is a divergence of opinion, but it
appears that the majority require privity here in an action of tort as well
as in the contract action of special assumpsit.8
Having found privity to be a prerequisite either in tort or contract, the
question arises of whether there is such a relation between the manufacturer
and sub-vendee or ultimate consumer. Because of our modern industrial sys-
tem with mass production and national advertising, it has been argued that
the consumer is essentially in privity of contract with the manufacturer.
Since the intermediate dealer is only a mere conduit bringing the parties to-
gether, is the warranty therefore extended not to the retailer, but to the ulti-
mate consumer? A research study found much evidence that manufacturers
actually so regard themselves in direct relation wiih the consumer.9
Might it not be possible that these advertisements by the manufacturer
be treated as a general offer on the part of the manufacturer which is accepted
8Stuart v. Wilkins (1778), 1 Dougl. 18.
4 Shippen v. Bowen (1886), 122 U. S. 575, 7 Sup. Ct. 1283; Schuchardt v.
Allers (1863), 1 Wall. 359, 368 (Either case or assumpsit will lie for a false
warranty; scienter need not be averred, and if averred, need not be proved).
5 (1842), 10 M. & W. 109; also, see a case note in 13 Indiana L. J. 85 as to
some of the extensions of the application of this rule.
6 Thomas v. Winchester (1852), 6 N. Y. 397; Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing
Machine Co. (1903), 120 F. 865; Delvin v. Smith (1882), 89 N. Y. 470;
Heaven v. Pender (1883), L. R., 11 Q. B. Division 503; Peru Heating Co. v.
Lenhart (1911), 48 Ind. App. 319, 95 N. E. 680; MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co. (1915), 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050; Boyd v. Coca Cola Bottling Works
(1914), 132 Tenn. 23, 177 S. W. 80.
7 "Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the goods
is an express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation . . . is to
induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods
relying thereon." Smith Hurd Ann. St. C. 121/2, Sec. 12; Burns Indiana
Statutes (1933), See. 58-112; Discussed in Williston, Sales (2nd), Sec. 194-,
and Williston, Contracts (2d), Sec. 1503.
8 Cases holding no privity is necessary: Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co.,
(1920), 189 Iowa 775, 176 N. W. 382, 17 A. L. R. 649; Ward Baking Co. v.
Trizzino (1928), 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N. E. 557; Mazetti v. Armour & Co.
(1913), 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633. Cases holding privity is necessary: Kramer
v. Mills Lumber Co. (1928), 24 F. (2d) 313, 60 A. L. R. 366; Connecticut Pie
Co. v. Lynch (1932), 57 F. (2d) 447; Turner v. Edison Storage Battery Co.
(1928), 248 N. Y. 73, 161 N. E. 423.
9 Bogert and Fink, Business Practice Regarding Warranties in the Sale of
Goods, 25 Illinois L. Rev. 400.
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by the ultimate consumer when he purchases the article from the retail
dealer?'O To answer these questions in the affirmative might give a just
result, but it would be stretching the law of contracts, and resorting to
fiction which would not be in line with the modern theory of law today.
The court also considered the possibility of a cause of action for misrepre-
sentation, but required a false representation with knowledge of the falsity.
This limitation, the requirement of "scienter,"1 1 has arisen because of the failure
of the courts to take into consideration the three types of liability for misrepre-
sentation: liability for an intended wrong-deceit; negligent wrong-misrepre-
sentation negligently made; and liability without fault-liability for innocent
misrepresentation.1 2  Under negligent misrepresentation there are the two
leading cases of Glanzer v. Skepard,la which imposed liability, and Ultramares
v. Touce,14 which reached an opposite result. Other cases have allowed a
recovery in the action of deceit where the defendant, although honestly believ-
ing his misrepresentations to be true, had at the time no reasonable grounds
so to believe ;15 however, this is actually not an intended invasion, under which
deceit is classed, but a negligent misrepresentation.
The principle underlying the decisions imposing absolute liability appears to
be that anyone, irrespective of good or bad faith on the part of the actor, who
profits 'as a result of his own false representation should bear the burden of
the injury to one who justifiably relies on the truth thereof.16 A relationship
is considered as arising out of the justifiable reliance, and privity of contract
has not been considered a limitation. A recent Washington case furnishes an
example of this basis of liability. In Baxter v. Ford Motor Sales,17 in which
the facts were almost identical with the instant case, the court held that it
was error to exclude catalogues put out by defendant representing that their
cars contained shatter proof glass. Here the court recognized a relation be-
tween the manufacturer and ultimate consumer which arises out of the mani-
facturer's advertisements, and thereby imposed absolute liability for innocent
misrepresentation.
The imposing of this absolute liability for misrepresentation, even though
limited by the nature of the relationship, has been criticized as outrageous,
and the opponents have advocated that liability for misrepresentations be
limited to negligent misrepresentations.18 But if this is true, why should not
this same test be applied to defamatory words? Yet the law governing
1O Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. (1893); 1 Q. B. 256.
IlPeek v. Derry (1889), 14 App. Case 337.
12 Harper, Law of Torts, Sec. 222.
13 (1920), 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N: E. 275.
'4 (1931), 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441. In relation to this, see Joillet v.
Cashman (1923), 235 N. Y. 511, 139 N. E. 714; Industrial Products v. Erie
R. R. (1927), 244 N. Y. 331, 155 N. E. 652.
15 Whitehurst v. Life Ins. Co. of Va. (1908),-149 N. C. 273, 62 S. E. 1067;
Prestwood v. Carlton (1909), 162 Ala. 327, 50 So. 254; Trimble v. Reid (1895),
97 Ky. 717, 31 S. W. 861.
16 McDaniel v. Crabtree (1927), 142 Wash. 168, 254 P. 1091; Chatham
Furnace Co. v. Moffatt (1888), 147 Mass. 403, 18 N. E. 168.
17 (1932), 168 Wash. 456, 12 P. (2d) 409.
18 Smith, Liability for Negligent Language, 14 Harvard L. Rev. 184.
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defamation is not a law requiring care and caution in greater or less degrees,
but a law of absolute liability qualified by an absolute exception.19
Admitting there is authority to support the imposition of absolute liability,
is such a result socially desirable? Is not this relationship, springing, as it
does, out of justifiable reliance, sufficient? Since the purpose of imposing
liability is the prevention of injury, it seems logical to have the pressure
brought to bear upon the one who controls the processes of production. It is
in such cases as this that liability for innocent misrepresentations might well
be imposed. Accordingly, it is submitted that although this is a new doctrine,
it is one which conforms to the needs of our modern economic society. There-
fore, a manufacturer who makes material representations relative to qualities
possessed by its products, knowing that such statements will be relied on,
should be held to strict liability for injuries to life, limb, or property, which
may be caused by lack of the qualities represented, although the parties are
not in privity of contract.
In conclusion it should be recognized that this is not a liability of warranty
or in deceit or negligence, but an absolute tort liability arising out of the
parties' relations in society.2 0  I.K.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-LIMrrATION OF INDEBTEDNESS-Action by Jefferson
School Township against Jefferson Township School Building Company to
secure the cancellation of a lease contract which the former contended placed
its indebtedness in excess 6f the amount which it could incur under Article 13
of the Indiana Constitution. The defendant was organized pursuant to an
act of the Indiana General Assembly of 1927 for the purpose of erecting a
school building which was to be used by Jefferson School Township, under
terms and conditions of a combined lease and contract, object of which was to
enable the school township eventually to become owner of the building. The
lease was for a term of 26 years, rent to be paid semi-annually, with an
option to purchase the property at any time, such purchase price in no event
to exceed amount actually invested by the lessor corporation. The school
township was to pay taxes and insurance, and make any repairs and improve-
ments necessary. If the rental payments should at any time exceed the amount
necessary to meet incidental corporate expenses and to pay dividends and
interest on outstanding securities of the lessor, such excess should be used in
the redemption and -cancellation of its securities at their par value; and if
the total excess of rental payments should be sufficient to redeem the out-
standing securities of the lessor and pay accrued interest and dividends, it
would convey all its right, title, and interest in and to the premises and
property in question to the lessee. In conclusion, the lease provided that
"nothing herein shall be construed to provide or impose any obligation on the
part of the lessee to purchase such schoolbuilding and property from the lessor,
19Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation, 24 Harvard L. Rev.
426; Artemus Jones (1909), 2 K. B. 444. (Query, should the interest of
reputation be awarded a greater degree of protection by the law than an
interest in bodily safety?)
20 For further study in this field see: Miller, Scienter in Deceit and Estoppel,
6 Indiana L. J1. 153; Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence, or
Warranty, 42 Harvard L. Rev. 732; Carpenter, Responsibility for Intentional,
Negligent and Innocent Misrepresentations, 24 Illinois L. Rev. 749.
